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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the family income -- college enrollment relationship and the evidence on
credit constraints in post-secondary schooling. We distinguish short-run liquidity constraints from the
long-term factors that promote cognitive and noncognitive ability. Long-run factors crystallized in ability
are the major determinants of the family income -- schooling relationship, although there is some
evidence that up to 4% of the total U.S. population is credit constrained in a short-run sense. Evidence
that IV estimates of the returns to schooling exceed OLS estimates is sometimes claimed to support the
existence of substantial credit constraints. This argument is critically examined.
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jjh@uchicago.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper interprets the evidence on the relationship between family income and college attendance. Figure
1 displays aggregate time series college participation rates for 18-24 year-old American males classiﬁed by their
parental income. Parental income is measured in the child’s late adolescent years. There are substantial diﬀerences
in college participation rates across family income classes in each year. This pattern is found in many other countries
(see the essays in Blossfeld and Shavit, 1993). In the late 1970s or early 1980s, college participation rates start to
increase in response to rising returns to schooling, but only for youth from the top income groups. This diﬀerential
educational response by income class promises to perpetuate or widen income inequality across generations and
among race and ethnic groups.
There are two, not necessarily mutually exclusive, interpretations of this evidence. The common interpretation
of the evidence and the one that guides policy is the obvious one. Credit constraints facing families in a child’s
adolescent years aﬀect the resources required to ﬁnance a college education. A second interpretation emphasizes
more long-run factors associated with higher family income. It notes that family income is strongly correlated over
the life cycle. Families with high income in the adolescent years are more likely to have high income throughout
the child’s life at home. Better family resources in a child’s formative years are associated with higher quality of
education and better environments that foster cognitive and noncognitive skills.
Both interpretations of the evidence are consistent with a form of credit constraint. The ﬁrst, more common,
interpretation is clearly consistent with this point of view. But the second interpretation is consistent with another
type of credit constraint: the inability of the child to buy the parental environment and genes that form the cognitive
and noncognitive abilities required for success in school. This interpretation renders a market failure as a type of
credit constraint.1
This paper argues on quantitative grounds that the second interpretation of Figure 1 is by far the more important
one. Controlling for ability formed by the mid teenage years, parental income plays only a minor role. The evidence
1Of course, the suggested market failure is whimsical since the preferences of the child are formed, in part, by the family into which
he/she is born. Ex post, the child may not wish a diﬀerent family, no matter how poor the family.
3from the US presented in this paper suggests that at most 4% of American youth are subject to short-term liquidity
constraints that aﬀect their post-secondary schooling. Most of the family income gap in enrollment is due to
long-term factors that produce the abilities needed to beneﬁt from participation in college.
The plan of this paper is as follows: We ﬁrst state the intuitive arguments justifying each interpretation. We
then consider more precise formulations starting with an inﬂuential argument advanced by Card (2001) and others.
That argument claims that evidence that instrumental variables (IV) estimates of the wage returns to schooling
(the Mincer coeﬃcient) exceed least squares estimates (OLS) is consistent with short-term credit constraints. We
make the following points about this argument: (1) The instruments used in the literature are invalid. Either they
are uncorrelated with schooling or they are correlated with omitted abilities. (2) Even granting the validity of the
instruments, instrumental variables estimates of the return to schooling may exceed least squares estimates even if
there are no short-term credit constraints. A large body of evidence on comparative advantage in the labor market is
consistent with IV > OLS. (3) The OLS-IV argument neglects the choice of quality of schooling. Constrained people
may choose low-quality schools and have lower estimated Mincer coeﬃcients (“rates of return”) and not higher ones.
Moreover, accounting for quality, the instruments used in the literature are invalid because they are determinants of
potential earnings.
We then move on to consider other arguments advanced in the literature in support of the empirical importance
of short-term credit constraints: (1) Kane (1994) claims that the sensitivity of college enrollment to tuition is greater
for people from poorer families. Greater tuition sensitivity of the poor, even if empirically true, does not prove
that they are constrained. Kane’s empirical evidence has been challenged by Cameron and Heckman (1999, 2001).
Conditioning on ability, responses to tuition are uniform across income groups. (2) Cameron and Heckman also
show that adjusting for long-term family factors (measured by ability or parental background) mostly eliminates
ethnic-racial gaps in schooling. We extend their analysis to eliminate most of the family income gaps in enrollment
by conditioning on long-term factors. (3) We also examine a recent qualiﬁcation of the Cameron-Heckman analysis
by Ellwood and Kane (2000), who claim to produce evidence of substantial credit constraints. We qualify their
qualiﬁcation. We ﬁnd that at most 4% of American youth are credit constrained in the short-run sense. For
many dimensions of college attendance (delay, quality of school attended and completion), adjusting for long-term
factors eliminates any role for short-term credit constraints associated with family income. (4) We also scrutinize
4the arguments advanced in support of short-term credit constraints that (a) the rate of return to human capital is
higher than that of physical capital and (b) rates of return to education are higher for individuals from low-income
families. We also review some of the main ﬁndings in the empirical literature.
The evidence assembled here suggests that the ﬁrst order explanation for gaps in enrollment in college by family
income is long-run family factors that are crystallized in ability. Short-run income constraints play a role, albeit a
quantitatively minor one. There is scope for intervention to alleviate these short-term constraints, but one should
not expect to eliminate the enrollment gaps in Figure 1 by eliminating such constraints.
2 Family Income and Enrollment in College
This relationship between family income and the college attendance of children can be interpreted in several, not
necessarily mutually exclusive, ways. The ﬁrst and most popular interpretation emphasizes that credit constraints
facing families in a child’s adolescent years aﬀect the resources required to ﬁnance a college education. The second
interpretation emphasizes the long-run factors associated with higher family income.
The argument that short-term family credit constraints are the most plausible explanation for the relationship
depicted in Figure 1 starts by noting that human capital is diﬀerent from physical capital. With the abolition of
slavery and indentured servitude, there is no asset market for human capital. People cannot sell rights to their
future labor earnings to potential lenders in order to secure ﬁnancing for their human capital investments. Even
if they could, there would be substantial problems in enforcing performance of contracts on future earnings given
that persons control their own labor supply and the eﬀort and quality of their work. The lack of collateral and
the inability to monitor eﬀort are widely cited reasons for current large-scale government interventions to ﬁnance
education.
If people had to rely on their own resources to ﬁnance all of their schooling costs, undoubtedly the level of educa-
tional attainment in society would decline. To the extent that subsidies do not cover the full costs of tuition, persons
are forced to raise tuition through private loans, through work while in college or through foregone consumption.
This may aﬀect the choice of college quality, the content of the educational experience, the decision of when to enter
college, the length of time it takes to complete schooling, and even graduation from college. Children from families
with higher income have access to resources that children from families with lower income do not have, although
5children from higher-income families still depend on the good will of their parents to gain access to funds. Limited
access to credit markets means that the costs of funds are higher for the children of the poor, and this limits their
enrollment in college2. This story apparently explains the evidence that shows that the enrollment response to the
rising educational premium that began in the late 1970s or early 1980s was concentrated in the top half of the
family-income distribution. Low-income whites and minorities began to respond to the rise in the return to college
education only in the 1990s. The reduction in the real incomes of families in the bottom half of the family income
distribution coupled with a growth in real tuition costs apparently contributes to growing disparity between the
college attendance of the children of the rich and of the poor.
An alternative interpretation of the same evidence is that long-run family and environmental factors play a
decisive role in shaping the ability and expectations of children. Families with higher levels of resources produce
higher-quality children who are better able to perform in school and take advantage of the new market for skills.
Children whose parents have higher income have access to better-quality primary and secondary schools. Chil-
dren’s tastes for education and their expectations about their life chances are shaped by those of their parents.
Educated parents are better able to develop scholastic aptitude in their children by assisting and directing their
studies. What is known about cognitive ability is that it is formed relatively early in life and becomes less malleable
as children age. By age 14, intelligence as measured by IQ tests seems to be fairly well set. (See the evidence
summarized in Heckman, 1995). Noncognitive skills appear to be more malleable until the late adolescent years.
(See Heckman, 2000 and Carneiro, Heckman and Manoli, 2002). The inﬂuences of family factors that are present
from birth through adolescence accumulate over many years to produce ability and college readiness. By the time
individuals ﬁnish high school, and scholastic ability is determined, the scope of tuition policy for promoting college
attendance through boosting cognitive and noncognitive skills is greatly diminished.
The interpretation that stresses the role of family and the environment does not necessarily rule out short-term
borrowing constraints as a partial explanation for Figure 1. However, if the ﬁnances of poor but motivated families
hinder them from providing decent elementary and secondary schooling for their children, and produce a low level of
2Evidence on educational responses to tuition subsidies is sometimes mistakenly interpreted as evidence on credit constraints. The
purchase of education is governed by the same principles that govern the purchase of other goods. The lower the price, the more likely
are people to buy the good. Dynarski (2000) presents recent evidence about the strength of these tuition eﬀects that is consistent with
a long line of research. In addition, there is, undoubtedly, a consumption component to education. Families with higher incomes may
buy more of the good for their children and buy higher quality education as well. This will contribute to the relationship displayed in
Figure 1.
6college readiness, government policy aimed at reducing the short-term borrowing constraints for the college expenses
of those children during their college-going years is unlikely to be eﬀective. Policy that improves the environments
that shape ability will be a more eﬀective avenue for increasing college enrollment in the long run. The issue can be
settled empirically. Surprisingly, little data have been brought to bear on this question until recently.
In this paper, we critically examine the evidence in the literature and present new arguments and evidence of
our own. There is evidence for both short-run and long-run credit constraints. Long-run family inﬂuence factors
produce both cognitive and noncognitive ability which vitally aﬀect schooling. Diﬀerences emerge early and, if
anything, are strengthened in school. Conditioning on long-term factors eliminates most of the eﬀect of family
income in the adolescent years on college enrollment decisions for most people, except for a small fraction of young
people. We reach similar conclusions for other dimensions of college participation — delay of entry, ﬁnal graduation,
length of time to complete school and college quality. For some of those dimensions, adjusting for long-run factors
eliminates or even overadjusts the family income gaps. At most, 4% of American youth are constrained. Credit
constraints in the late adolescent years play a role for a small group of youth who can be targeted.
In the next section, we review and criticize the argument that comparisons between IV and OLS estimates of the
returns to schooling are informative about the importance of credit constraints.
3 OLS, IV and Evidence On Credit Constrained Schooling
A large body of literature devoted to the estimation of “causal” eﬀe c t so fs c h o o l i n gh a sf o u n dt h a ti nm a n y
applications instrumental variable estimates of the return to schooling exceed OLS estimates. (See Griliches, 1977;
Card, 1999, 2001.) Researchers have used compulsory schooling laws, distance to the nearest college or tuition as
their instruments to estimate the return to schooling.
Since IV can be interpreted as estimating the return for those induced to change their schooling status by the
selected instrument, ﬁnding higher returns for changers suggests that they are credit constrained persons who face
higher marginal costs of schooling. This argument has become very popular among applied researchers. (See e.g.
Kane, 2001.)
For three reasons, this evidence is not convincing on the issue of the existence of credit constraints. First, the
validity of the instruments used in this literature is questionable. Second, even granting the validity of the instruments,
7the IV-OLS evidence is consistent with models of self-selection or comparative advantage in the labor market even
in the absence of credit constraints (Carneiro, Heckman and Manoli, 2002; Heckman, 2001; Carneiro, Heckman and
Vytlacil, 2001). Third, the argument ignores the quality margin. As the evidence presented in Carneiro, Heckman
and Manoli (2002) shows, one manifestation of credit constraints is lower-quality schooling. Students will attend
two-year schools instead of four-year schools, or will attend lower-quality schools at any level of attained years of
schooling. Moreover, even if the OLS-IV comparison were convincing, the IV procedure does not identify the credit
constrained people. We now elaborate on these points.
Models of Heterogeneous Returns
A major development in economics is recognition of heterogeneity in response to education and other interventions
as an empirically important phenomenon (Heckman, 2001). In terms of a familiar regression model for schooling S,
we may write wages as
lnW = α + βS + ε (1)
where E(ε)=0and β varies among people, and both β and ε may be correlated with S. In that case, conventional
intuitions about least square bias, ability bias and the performance of instrumental variables break down.
Another representation of (1) is in terms of potential outcomes (see Heckman and Robb, 1986). Let lnW1 be
the wage of a person if schooled; lnW0 is the wage if not schooled.
lnW1 = µ1 + U1 E(U1)=0
lnW0 = µ0 + U0 E(U0)=0
so β =l nW1 − lnW0 = µ1 − µ0 + U1 − U0, α = µ0, and ε = U0. β is the marginal return to schooling. There is a
distribution of β in the population. No single number describes “the” rate of return to education. Many diﬀerent
“eﬀects” of schooling can be deﬁned and estimated. Diﬀerent estimators deﬁne diﬀerent parameters. Diﬀerent
instruments deﬁne diﬀerent parameters. None of these parameters necessarily answers policy-relevant questions
(Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001; Heckman, 2001).
8The Roy model of income distribution is based on a simple schooling rule:
S =1 if W1 − W0 − C>0
S =0otherwise
where C is direct cost (“tuition”). This model gives rise to comparative advantage in the labor market, which has
been shown to be empirically important in Sattinger (1978, 1980), Willis and Rosen (1979), Heckman and Sedlacek
(1985, 1990), Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) and others. Models of comparative advantage in earnings
diﬀer from conventional models of earnings by recognizing two or more potential skills for each person rather than
the one skill eﬃciency units view of the human capital model that dominated the early discussion of ability bias
(Griliches, 1977). The early discussion of ability bias implicitly assumed that U1 = U0 so β is a constant for all
persons given personal characteristics X.
Invalid Instruments
Putting aside for the moment the issue of heterogeneity in rates of return, there is considerable doubt about the
validity of the instruments used in the literature. Here we consider a common coeﬃcient model of schooling and
earnings (β the same for everyone conditional on characteristics X) and present conditions under which ˆ βIV > ˆ βOLS
if the variable we are using as an instrument is correlated with the residual of the wage equation. We show empirical
evidence that is suggestive that this is an empirically important problem.
The ability bias literature considered the ability bias problem to be an omitted variables problem. In the true
model,
lnW = α + βS + γA + ε
where A is ability and β is the (homogeneous) common return to schooling U1 = U0 = ε. However, in traditional
formulations A is an omitted variable. To focus on the central argument in this literature, suppose that COV (S,ε)=
0, COV (S,A) > 0 and that γ > 0 (individuals of high ability take more schooling and ability has a positive eﬀect
on wages). Suppose we have a candidate instrument Z with the properties that COV (Z,ε)=0 , COV (Z,S) 6=0
but COV (Z,A) 6=0 ,s oZ is an invalid instrument. Then
9plim ˆ βOLS = β + γ
COV (S,A)
V (S)
plim ˆ βIV = β + γ
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where the ρXY is the correlation between X and Y .I f COV (Z,S) < 0, the ordering is reversed and
ρZA < ρSAρSZ.
Few data sets contain measures of ability. However the NLSY data (see Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2001)
contains AFQT which is a measure of ability. Using this data we can test the validity of alternative commonly
used instruments by estimating the correlation between Z and A. Table 1 presents evidence on this and the other
correlations. (The sources of the data for this and other tables and ﬁgures in this paper are given in the appendix.)
The ﬁnal column reports whether the pattern of correlations predicted under the bad instrument hypothesis is found
and is statistically signiﬁcant. This table suggests that the literature is plagued by bad instrumental variables: they
are either correlated with S and A or they are uncorrelated with S. The conditions required for plim ˆ βIV >plim
ˆ βOLS hold for most instruments which suggests that the evidence that ˆ βIV > ˆ βOLS may be just a consequence of
using bad instruments3, and says nothing about credit constraints.
3We perform this test using the original AFQT tests and the test corrected for the endogeneity of schooling on test scores using the
10Comparative Advantage and Negative Selection Bias
Suppose, provisionally, that the instruments are valid. We now return to a case where β varies across people and
people self-select into schooling based on β. In the simple two-skill Roy model with no direct costs (C =0 ) ,i tm u s t
be the case that persons with the highest returns to schooling (β) select into schooling (choose S =1 ) , while those
with the lowest returns do not. This implies that the average return to schooling for those who go to school,
E(β|S =1 )=E(lnW1 − lnW0|S =1 ) ,
is higher than the return to persons just at the margin of going to school. The same analysis holds when C is
introduced, provided that it is not too strongly positively correlated with W1−W0
4. In this case, which is illustrated
in Figure 2, the marginal entrant into schooling has a lower return than the average person attending school. Figure
2 plots the average returns to people with diﬀerent characteristics as a function of how those characteristics aﬀect
the probability of going to college. In this ﬁgure people with characteristics that make them more likely to go to
school have higher returns on average than those with characteristics that make them less likely to go to school.
If the costs of attending school are suﬃciently positively correlated with returns, the shape of Figure 2 does not
necessarily arise. If persons with high returns (β) also face high costs, then marginal entrants may have a higher
return than the average return of persons who go to school (E(β|S =1 ) ) . This could arise if people face credit
constraints, e.g., dumb kids have rich parents and bright kids have poor parents. This case is illustrated in Figure
3.
Comparing the returns of people who attend school (E(β|S =1 ) )with the returns of people at the margin of
attending school would be one way to test the existence of credit constraints. Under standard assumptions used in
discrete choice and sample selection models (see Vytlacil, 2002, for a statement of these conditions), valid instrumental
variable estimators identify the persons who change schooling status in response to the intervention, and are at (or
near) the margin deﬁned by the instrument (Imbens and Angrist, 1994; Card, 2001).
If IV estimators of the return to schooling are above E(β|S =1 ) , then it is plausible that credit constraints
are operative — persons attracted to school by a change in a policy (or an instrument) earn more than the average
methods developed and applied in Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2002). We get the same results whether or not we adjust the test score
for the eﬀect of schooling on AFQT. Results are available from the authors on request.
4Precise conditions are given in Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001).
11person who attends school (see Figure 2). This idea is empirically operationalized in the literature by comparing OLS
estimators of the coeﬃcient on S to the IV estimator. Griliches (1977) ﬁrst noted that IV estimates of the return
to schooling often exceed OLS estimates. Card (1999, 2001) reports a systematic body of evidence consistent with
Griliches’ ﬁnding and interprets this as evidence of important credit constraints in the ﬁnancing of schooling.
However even if the instruments are valid the test is not informative because the least squares estimator does not
identify
E(β|S =1 )=E(lnW1 − lnW0|S =1 ) .
Rather it identiﬁes
E(lnW|S =1 )− E(lnW|S =0 )=E(β|S =1 )+{E(U0|S =1 )− E(U0|S =0 ) }.
In a model without variability in the returns to schooling, E(β|S =1 )=E(β)=β is the same constant for
everyone, so it is plausible that if U0 is ability, the second term in parentheses will be positive (more able people
attend school). This is the model of ability bias that motivated Griliches (1977). As noted by Willis and Rosen
(1979), and conﬁrmed in a nonparametric setting by Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001), if there is comparative
advantage, the term in brackets may be negative. People who go to school may be the worst persons in the W0
distribution, i.e. E(U0|S =1 ) −E(U0|S =0 )< 0 (even though they could be the best persons in the W1 distribution).
This could oﬀset the positive E(U1 −U0|S =1 )and make the OLS estimate below that of the IV estimate. Only if
the sorting on skills is suﬃciently weakly negative (or positive) will the Card test be informative on the question of
credit rationing.
Symmetrically, if there is credit rationing (the marginal entrant induced into schooling faces a higher return than
is experienced by the average person who attends school), OLS estimates of the return to schooling might exceed IV
estimates if sorting is suﬃciently strongly positive (E(U0|S =1 )− E(U0|S =0 )> 0). Thus the proposed test for
credit constraints has no power under either null hypothesis: binding credit constraints or no credit constraints5.
The fallacy in the test is to assume that the OLS estimate is at least as large as the average return to people who
take schooling. In a model of comparative advantage of the sort conﬁrmed in a series of empirical studies of labor
5This reasoning extends easily to a model with multiple levels of schooling.
12markets, nothing guarantees this condition. Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) present evidence from several
data sets that the condition is in fact violated and E(U0|S =1 )− E(U0|S =0 )< 0.
We estimate the returns to college using IV and OLS in several data sets and using diﬀerent instruments and we
ﬁnd that βIV > βOLS is a robust empirical result. However when we estimate the marginal return for people with
diﬀerent characteristics, i.e. the eﬀect of treatment for people at diﬀerent margins of indiﬀerence between going to
college and not going (see Heckman and Vytlacil, 2000; and Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2001), we ﬁnd a general
declining pattern in all these data sets which indicates that the returns for the average person are higher than the
returns for the marginal person. A declining marginal treatment eﬀect means that returns are higher for individuals
who go to college. We estimate that E (β|S =1 )> βIV > βOLS. This declining pattern for the marginal treatment
eﬀects holds generally even when we estimate it separately for diﬀerent income groups and diﬀerent ability groups.
See Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) and Carneiro, Heckman and Manoli (2002).
College Quality
The literature also neglects choice at the quality margin. Accounting for choice of quality provides yet another
interpretation of the OLS-IV evidence and casts further doubt on the validity of the instruments used in this
literature. We develop a two-period model of credit-constrained schooling where agents can lend but cannot borrow.
We demonstrate that when agents adjust on the quality margin as well as the quantity margin, instrumental variables
(e.g. policy changes) that induce constrained students to attend lower quality schools can lower the estimated Mincer
return to schooling. The evidence that βIV > βOLS can just as well be interpreted as suggesting the absence of
credit constraints. This analysis also shows that Mincer returns can be very misleading guides to the true rate of
return.





where C0 and C1 denote consumption in the ﬁrst and second periods respectively. The agent possesses exogenous
income ﬂows in each period, Y0 and Y1. One can think of Y0 as parental income. Individuals are constrained in
their schooling choices only if they seek to borrow against future income (i.e., if saving is non-positive).
13We consider three choices for schooling: not attending school, attending a low quality school and attending
a high quality school. Think of S =1as denoting college attendance. S =0is high school attendance. Di is an
indicator equal to one if the agent chooses quality of schooling qi,i=1 ,2. qi denotes the costs of schooling associated












where φ(qi) is the production function or wage output associated with the quality of level qi. Evidence presented
by Black and Smith (2002) and others suggests that high quality schooling (in college) has a substantial eﬀect on
lifetime earnings. To ﬁxi d e a s ,s p e c i f y
φ(q)=Aqγ,A>0, 0 < γ < 1,
so we reach a familiar Mincer-like wage equation:




When choosing not to attend college (S =0 ) , an agent works in both the ﬁrst and second periods and makes W0
per period. In choosing to attend schooling the agent does not earn the initial wage in the ﬁrst period and also pays
the costs of attending school q; in the second period, the agent makes W0φ(q).W ea s s u m eq2 >q 1 > 1 and hence
φ(q2) > φ(q1) > 1. Notice that persons who attend college at a lower quality school earn a lower Mincer return but
have a rate of return higher than the market interest rate.
For agents who are net savers and are not credit constrained, only ability matters, so agents with high ability
attend high quality schools, agents of moderate ability attend medium quality schools, and agents of low ability do
not attend school. For persons who are constrained, consumption in each period is equal to their exogenous income
ﬂow plus or minus the costs or earnings from the schooling decision. This model generalizes Becker (1975) and Card
(1995) by explicitly accounting for preferences, including time preference. In the credit constrained economy, the
14three choices and their associated utilities are as follows:
a. No School: S =0 ,q=0




b. Low Quality Schooling: S =1 ,q= q1




c. High Quality Schooling: S =1 ,q= q2




The agent maximizes utility and chooses the schooling that yields the highest utility: take No School if
U0 >U 1,U 2; take Low Quality Schooling if U1 >U 0,U 2; or take High Quality Schooling if U2 >U 1,U 0.
Suppose that A varies in the population and is unobserved. γ,ρ and α are common parameters. W0,Y 0 and
Y1 are observed. Let X =( W0,Y 0,Y1) and assume E(lnA|X)=0and assume that selection into schooling status
depends on these parameters. The higher A,t h el o w e rρ, the higher Y0 and the lower the cost of quality the more
likely will S =1 . These forces also work toward making people select higher quality schooling. Any estimated
return to schooling depends on the quality of schooling selected.
Suppose there is a valid instrument, say a policy targeted toward low Y0 persons, that shifts people from S =0
to (S =1 ,D 1 =1 )status. It leads poor people to attend low quality schools. The Mincer return to schooling for
these people is
γ lnq1.
This is smaller in general than the least squares estimator
γ [(lnq1)P1 +( l nq2)P2]+{E(lnA|S =1 ,X) − E(lnA|S =0 ,X)}
15where
P1 =P r ( D1 =1 |S =1 ,X)
and
P2 =P r ( D2 =1 |S =1 ,X)
and selection implies that the term in braces is positive (more able people are more likely to attend school).
The agents are credit constrained, but pick low quality schooling when they attend college. This analysis shows
that when quality is added to the Becker-Card model, and it is not accounted for in the estimation, credit-constrained
persons induced to attend college by a policy or an instrument directed toward low-income persons may have lower
estimated returns than the average person. The estimated Mincer return is not, of course, the true rate of return.
Note further that tuition (q) is not a valid instrument because it aﬀects potential outcomes (through ϕ(q)).
Distance is like tuition in many respects and is also unlikely to be a valid instrument. Nearby schools are generally
of lower quality. This is another argument against the validity of several of the instruments commonly used in the
literature.
Inaccurate Targeting of Credit Constrained People
An additional point is that in general IV does not identify the credit constrained people. IV methods do not
allow us to identify the group of people for whom it would be useful to target an intervention. Using a direct method
like the one described next we can identify a group of high-ability people who are not going to college and we can
target policy interventions towards them.
4 Adjusting Family Income Gaps by Ability or Other Long-Term Fam-
ily Factors
A more direct approach to testing the relative importance of long-run factors vs. short-run credit constraints in
accounting for the evidence in Figure 1 is to condition on long-run factors and examine if there is any additional role
for short-run credit constraints. Conditioning on observables also oﬀers the promise of identifying speciﬁc subgroups
of persons who might be constrained and who might be targeted by policies.
16Cameron and Heckman (1998, 1999, 2001) compare the estimated eﬀects of family background and family income
on college attendance with, and without, controlling for scholastic ability (AFQT). Measured scholastic ability is
inﬂuenced by long-term family and environmental factors, which are in turn produced by the long-term permanent
income of families. To the extent that the inﬂuence of family income on college attendance is diminished by the
inclusion of scholastic ability in an analysis of college attendance, one would conclude that long-run family factors
crystallized in AFQT scores are the driving force behind schooling attainment, and not short-term credit constraints.
Fitting a lifecycle model of schooling to a subsample of the NLSY data on youth with AFQT measured before high
school graduation, Cameron and Heckman examine what portion of the gap in school attendance at various levels
between minority youth and whites is due to family income, to tuition costs, and to family background (see BLS,
2001, for a description of the NLSY data). They ﬁnd that when they do not control for ability measured at an
early age, about half (5 points) of the 11 point gap between black and white college attendance rates is due to
family income; more than half (4 points) of the 7 point diﬀerence between Hispanics and whites is due to family
income. When scholastic ability is accounted for, only one half of one point of the 11 point black-white gap is
explained for family income. For Hispanics, the gap actually widens when family income is included. Equalizing
ability more than accounts for minority-majority college attendance gaps. Comparable results are obtained when
they adjust for parental education and family structure6.T h e e ﬀects of tuition on college entry are also greatly
weakened when measures of ability are included. Ability, and not ﬁnancial resources, in the teenage years accounts
for pronounced minority-majority diﬀerences in schooling attainment. The disincentive eﬀects of college tuition on
college attendance are dramatically weakened when ability is included in the analysis of college attendance. This
analysis suggests that it is long-run factors that determine college attendance, not short-term borrowing constraints,
that explain the evidence in Figure 1.
It is sometimes claimed that the enrollment responses to tuition should be larger for constrained (low-income)
persons. (See Kane, 1994, and the survey in Ellwood and Kane, 2000.) This does not follow from any rigorous
argument7. Table 2 taken from Cameron and Heckman (1999) explicitly addresses this issue empirically. (See in
6The authors condition on an early measure of ability not contaminated by feedback from schooling to test scores that is documented
in Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2002).
7Mulligan (1997) shows that in the context of a Becker-Tomes model that tuition elasticities for human capital accumulation are
greater (in absolute value) for unconstrained people. His proof easily generalizes to more general preferences (results are available on
request from the authors). By a standard argument in discrete choice Kane’s claim cannot be rigorously established. Let S =1if
I (t,X) ≥ ε where I is an index of net beneﬁt from college, t is tuition, ∂I
∂t < 0 and X are other variables, including income. ε is an
17particular panels B and C.8). Even without adjusting for AFQT, there is no pattern in the estimated tuition eﬀects
by family income level. When they condition on ability, tuition eﬀects become smaller (in absolute value) and no
pattern by family income is apparent. Even if the argument had theoretical validity, there is no empirical support
for it.
Ellwood and Kane (2000) accept the main point of Cameron and Heckman that academic ability is a major
determinant of college entry. At the same time, they argue that family income operates as an additional constraint,
not as powerful as academic ability, but more easily addressed by policy than ability. Figure 4 presents our version
o ft h e i rc a s eu s i n gt h eN L S Y 7 9( s e et h ea p p e n d i xf o rab r i e f discussion of these data). Classifying white males by
their test score terciles, we display college enrollment rates by family income. There is a clear ordering in the
high-ability group and in other ability groups as well. Persons from families with higher income are more likely to
enroll in college. This ordering occurs in other data sets, even for low-ability groups.
These plots indicate a subsidiary, but still quantitatively important role for family income in accounting for
schooling enrollment. Does this mean that short-run credit constraints are operative in the college-going years?
Not necessarily. Family income in the adolescent years is strongly correlated with family income throughout the life
cycle. In addition, long-run family resources likely produce many skills that are not fully captured by a single test
score.
When we control for early family background factors (parental education, family structure and place of residence)
we greatly weaken this relationship. Table 3 reports estimated gaps by income quartile relative to the top income
quartile after adjustment for the covariates listed at the top of the table. These gaps are denoted “Beta” and are
presented for diﬀerent AFQT groups and overall for the six dimensions of college participation listed in the heading of
each panel. Standard errors and t statistics are presented for each estimated adjusted gap. Focusing on enrollment





where f (ε) i st h ed e n s i t yo fp s y c h i cc o s t s .T h e n








For constrained persons with very low income, I (t,X) is small. Depending on the density of ε,t h el o c a t i o no fI (t,X) in the support
of the density, and the value of
∂I(t,X)
∂t , constrained persons may have larger or smaller tuition responses than unconstrained persons.
Thus if ε is normal, and I (t,X) −→ −∞ for constrained people, if the derivative is bounded, the tuition response is zero for constrained
people.
8Standard errors are not presented in their paper but test statistics for hypothesis of equality are presented.
18(Panel A), we cannot reject the hypothesis that in the high-ability group all gaps are zero (see test statistic for “All
Gaps = 0” at the base of the panel). If we do not condition on AFQT we reject the hypothesis (see the estimates
under “Total”), and ﬁnd strong family income eﬀects. Figure 5 plots the adjusted family income gaps.
Table 4 presents estimates of the percentage of the white male population that is credit constrained overall (ﬁgure
in box) and broken down into ability - income components (rest of the table) for each of the dimensions listed in the
panel headings of the table9. Thus Panel A of Table 4 presents estimates of the fraction credit constrained in terms
of college enrollment (as a fraction of the entire white male population) by diﬀerent AFQT groups. The percent
credit constrained is deﬁned as the gap between the percentage enrollment in the highest income quartile for each
ability tercile and the percentage in the other income quartiles. The strongest evidence for a constraint is in the
lowest ability tercile. “Dumb rich kids” are more likely to enroll in college than are “dumb poor kids.” Cumulating
over all AFQT terciles, we estimate a total of 2.8% of all white males to be constrained in college enrollment.
Most of the analysis in the literature focuses on college enrollment and much less on other dimensions of college
attendance such as completion, quality of school and delay of entry into college10. In part, this emphasis is due
to reliance on CPS data which is much more reliable for studying enrollment-family income relationships than
completion-family income relationships.
Using the NLSY 79 data we look at other dimensions of college participation. The remaining panels of Tables 3
and 4 test for disparity and report estimates of the credit constrained for these other dimensions. When we perform
a parallel analysis for college completion of four-year college (Panel B), we ﬁnd no evidence of constraints and in fact
overadjust college enrollment for the poor in the ﬁrst and third ability terciles. Figures 6 and 7 present the raw and
adjusted gaps for completion of four-year college. There is no evidence of short-run credit constraints (see Panel B).
There is evidence of short-run credit constraints for the “dumb poor” in completing two years of college, but not for
the “bright poor” (see Panel C). There is weak evidence in certain cells for short-term credit constraints in years of
delay of entry (panel E) and for choice of two-year vs. four-year colleges, which is a measure of quality. Depending
on the measure of college participation selected, the estimated percent constrained ranges from 0 to 6%. Setting
statistically insigniﬁcant gaps to zero we obtain a much smaller range of values (0-1%). We obtain comparable
9We delete an entry for years of delay because the gaps are not expressed in percentages and there is no natural way to estimate the
percent constrained.
10Work in school is studied in Keane and Wolpin (2001). Delay in entry is studied in Kane (1996).
19results for other demographic groups.
Table 5 records overestimates of the percent constrainted for each dimension of college going reported in Table
4 for all demographic groups (these are the corresponding numbers in the boxes in Table 4). Overall, the percent
constrained ranges from 3.8% (for completion of two year college) to esentially zero percent for completion of four
year college. The strongest evidence for short term credit constraints is for Hispanic males. The weakest evidence is
for Black males for whom, on many dimensions, the eﬀective constraint is zero. Overall, there is little evidence that
short term credit constraints explain much of the gap in college participation.11
Policies that improve ﬁnancing of the education of these identiﬁed subgroups will increase their human capital
and may well be justiﬁed on objective cost-beneﬁt criteria12. For these groups, the beneﬁts to reducing delay, and
promoting earlier college completion, higher college quality and graduation, are likely to be substantial. But in
designing policies to harvest this beneﬁt, it is important to target the interventions toward the constrained. Broad-
based policies generate dead weight. For example, Dynarski (2001) and Cameron and Heckman (1999) estimate that
93% of President Clinton’s Hope scholarship funds, which were directed towards middle-class families, were given to
children who would attend school even without the program.
While targeting the identiﬁed constrained may be good policy, it is important not to lose sight of the main factors
accounting for the gaps in Figure 1. Family background factors as crystallized in ability are the ﬁrst order factor
explaining college attendance and completion gaps.
These diﬀerences in average ability appear at early ages and persist. Figure 8 plots average PIAT-Math test
scores by family income quartiles at diﬀerent ages from a longitudinal study of young children (Children of NLSY79;
see BLS, 2001). These diﬀerences in average test scores by income quartile are ampliﬁed by schooling, and this
diﬀerence is more pronounced between diﬀerent racial groups than between diﬀerent income groups. (See Carneiro,
Heckman and Manoli, 2002.) Even conditioning on a comprehensive set of variables, including parental education,
early family income and mother’s ability does not eliminate this gap for the math test score we present here.13 Gaps
between scores of diﬀerent racial and income groups on memory tests appear as early as age one. A major conclusion
11Decompositions for all demographic groups in the format of Table 4 are available on request from the authors.
12The potential economic loss from delay can be substantial. If V is the economic value of attending school, and schooling is delayed
o n ey e a r ,t h e nt h ec o s t so fd e l a yo fs c h o o l i n gb yo n ey e a ra r e
r
1+r
V where r is the rate of return. For r = .10, which is not out of line
with estimates in the literature, this delay is 9% of the value of lifetime schooling (roughly $20,000).
13For other test scores it is possible to eliminate racial gaps at early ages.
20of the literature is that the ability that is decisive in producing schooling diﬀerentials is shaped early in life. If we
are to substantially eliminate ethnic and income diﬀerentials in schooling, we must start early, and we cannot rely
on tuition policy.
At the same time, it must be acknowledged that policies to foster ability are costly (see Heckman, 2000, and
Carneiro, Heckman and Manoli, 2002). The mechanisms generating ability remain to be fully explored. Policies that
eﬃciently target the constrained are likely to pass a rigorous cost beneﬁtt e s t .
5 H i g hR a t eo fR e t u r nt oS c h o o l i n gC o m p a r e dt ot h eR e t u r no nP h y s -
ical Capital
Estimates of the rate of return to schooling, based on the Mincer earnings function, are often above 10% and
sometimes as high as 15%. Estimates based on instrumental variables are especially high. See, for example, the
evidence surveyed by Card (1999, 2001). It is sometimes claimed that these returns are very high and therefore
people are credit constrained or some other market failure is present (see Krueger, 2002).
However, the cross-section Mincerian rate of return to schooling does not, in general, estimate the internal rate
of return to schooling. See Heckman, Lochner and Taber (1998) for an example where cross-section rates of return
are uninformative about the return to schooling that any person faces. Heckman, Lochner and Todd (2001) state the
conditions under which the Mincerian rate of return will be equal to the internal rate of return to schooling. Even if
these conditions are satisﬁed, implicit comparisons are usually made against the risk-free interest rate. However this
is not the relevant comparison. Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2001a,b) estimate considerable uncertainty in the
returns to school. Furthermore, issues of illiquidity and irreversibility of the investment may also drive the premium
on human capital far above the safe interest rate (see Judd, 2000). Comparisons of Mincer returns and returns to
capital are intrinsically uninformative about the existence of credit constraints or the need for intervention in human
capital markets.
216 Are Rates of Return to Schooling Higher for Persons from Low-
Income Families?
If low-income families are credit constrained, then at the margin the returns to schooling for their children should
be higher since they are investing less than the eﬃcient amount (assuming equal technology across families). We
have already established that if choices made at the quality margin, the estimated Mincer return may be lower for
constrained persons, unless adjustments for quality are made. The empirical literature, which does not adjust for
quality, ﬁnds that returns to school are higher for high-ability people than for low-ability people. See for example
Meghir and Palme (1999), Cawley, Heckman and Vytlacil (2000), Taber (2001) or the evidence in Carneiro, Heckman
and Manoli (2002). Family income and child ability are positively correlated so one would expect higher returns to
schooling for children of high-income families just for this reason. Altonji and Dunn (1996) ﬁnd in their preferred
empirical speciﬁcation that the returns to schooling are higher for children of more educated families than for children
of less educated families. There is no evidence that rates of return to schooling are higher for children from low-income
families than for children from high-income families14.
7 Additional Evidence from the Literature
Cameron and Heckman (1998) analyze the determinants of grade by grade schooling attainment for cohorts of Amer-
ican males born between 1908 and 1964. Consistent with the notion that family income and family background
factors reﬂect long-run and not short-term inﬂuences on schooling attainment, they ﬁnd income and family back-
ground factors are powerful determinants of schooling completion from elementary school through graduate school.
An appeal to borrowing constraints operating in the college years is not required to explain the relationship between
family income and college attendance decisions and the stability of the relationship over long periods of time.
Cameron and Taber (2001) examine the importance of borrowing constraints in a model that incorporates the
14The take-up rate on Pell Grants and Perkins Loans targeted towards students from low income families is low (See Orﬁeld, 1992).
Many more people are eligible for support than those who claim it. Binding borrowing constraints are not a plausible explanation for
the lack of utilization of these potential resources. Kane (1999) suggests that nonmonetary costs of applying for ﬁnancial aid may be
high especially for low income people because the application process is complex. He argues that decreasing these costs may be a more
promising avenue for relaxing ﬁnancing constraints for low income people than expanding existing programs. He provides no evidence for
this conjecture. An alternative explanation consistent with our evidence and that is reported in Carneiro, Heckman and Manoli (2002)
is that many eligible persons perceive that even with a substantial tuition subsidy, the returns to college education for them are too low
to pay for the foregone earnings required to attend school. Risk aversion due to the uncertainty of income ﬂows may also reduce the
returns relative to the beneﬁts.
22insight that both schooling choices and returns to schooling will be inﬂuenced by borrowing constraints. Using a
variety of methods, they ﬁnd no evidence that borrowing constraints play a role in explaining the years of schooling
attained of recent cohorts of American youth. Keane and Wolpin (2001) estimate a more explicit sequential dynamic
model and reach the same conclusion. Students are estimated to be short-run constrained but alleviate the constraints
through working. Relaxing the budget constraint barely budges schooling decisions but aﬀects work while in school.
Neither study looks at delay or quality eﬀects which we have found to be quantitatively important (Carneiro, Heckman
and Manoli, 2002; Kane, 1996). Stanley (1999) studies the impact of the G.I. Bill on college-going decisions of Korean
War Veterans. Consistent with our story, he ﬁnds that most college subsidies were used by veterans from families
in the top half of the socioeconomic distribution. When she studies the eﬀects of the HOPE program in Georgia,
Dynarski (2000) ﬁnds that it beneﬁts mostly middle and higher-income students. However the elasticity of enrollment
to tuition subsidies in this sample is as high as anywhere else in the literature: middle and higher-income people
do not seem to respond more elastically to education subsidies than lower-income people. This is consistent with
the evidence from Cameron and Heckman presented in Section 4. Shea (2000) estimates the eﬀect of a measure
of parental income on schooling using the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics (see Hill, 1992, for a description of
this dataset). Controlling for parental background variables, he ﬁnds an eﬀect of his measure of family income on
schooling, controlling for ability. However, using instrumental variables he estimates no eﬀect of his measure of
family income on schooling attainment and he interprets this result as evidence of no credit constraints15.
8C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we examine arguments about the strength of credit constraints in schooling that are made in the
literature. We evaluate the available evidence and present new evidence using American data.
Some of the evidence in the literature is uninformative on this question. The leading example is the IV-OLS
evidence discussed in Section 3. The literature on price eﬀects and tuition subsidies in general is also not very
informative on this question since it does not separate price eﬀects from borrowing constraints.
15Shea splits his sample into children of educated and uneducated parents. He ﬁnds an eﬀect of his measure of income on the schooling
attainment of the children of the latter. Krueger (2002) interprets this as evidence for credit constraints. However Shea’s measure of
income is an average income over every year the family is sampled irrespective of the age of the child. It is a long run measure of
permanent income for some families for which data are available over the life cycle of the family and the child and a short run measure
when the sampling process starts in the child’s adolescent years. Thus Shea’s estimated income eﬀect combines short run and long run
eﬀects in an uninterpretable fashion and is thus uninformative on the issue of the empirical importance of short run credit constraints.
23The observed correlation between family income and college attendance can be interpreted as arising in two
diﬀerent ways: from short-run credit constraints or from long-run family eﬀects. The latter are quantitatively more
important, even though we identify a group of people (at most 4% of the population) who seem to be facing short-run
credit constraints. The ﬁrst order factors accounting for the gaps in Figure 1 are long-term factors that cannot
easily be oﬀset by tuition policy or supplements to family income in the adolescent years of prospective students.
All of our empirical analysis is for contemporary American society where a substantial ediﬁce of ﬁnancial aid to
support post-secondary education is in place. Our assessment of the limited role of short-run credit constraints in
explaining contemporary American educational gaps is, no doubt, in part due to the successful operation of these
policies which were designed to eliminate such constraints. Substantial reductions in the generosity of educational
beneﬁts would undoubtedly aﬀect participation in college although they would operate primarily through price
eﬀects. However, the evidence in Blossfeld and Shavit (1993), Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Cossa (2000)
suggests the universal ﬁrst order importance of long-term family inﬂuences on educational attainment. Gaps in
educational attainment related to family background arise in many diﬀerent environments including those with free
tuition and no restrictions on college entry. This evidence points to the powerful role of the long-term factors that
we have emphasized in this paper.
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10 Appendix
Table 1 uses a sample of white males from NLSY79. Distance to four-year colleges, tuition and local labor market
variables are computed using the county of residence at age 17. When it is not possible to get the county of residence
at age 17 for a given person we use the county of residence at 14. For details of the construction of these variables
see Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil (2001) and Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman (2001). AFQT is corrected by the
following procedure: ﬁrst group people by completed schooling (dropout, high school graduate, GED, some two-year
college, two-year degree, some four-year college, four-year degree); then within completed schooling group regress
raw AFQT scores on schooling at test date. Corrected AFQT is the intercept plus the residual of the regression. See
Hansen, Heckman and Mullen (2002). This adjustment does not aﬀect the estimates based on the unadjusted test
scores.
Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 4-7 are for a sample of white males in NLSY79. We require everyone to have a
valid family income observation at 17 or in 1979 and also a valid AFQT observation. In Figure 4 (and 6) we
organize individuals into family income - AFQT cells and then compute the percentage of people enrolled in college
(completing four-year college) within each of these cells. In Figure 5 (and 7) we ﬁrst regress college enrollment
(completion of four-year college) on a set of family background variables and then compute the average residual for
each family income - AFQT cell. We do this same residualization in Table 3 (but for many more dimensions of
college participation) and then estimate, within each AFQT tercile, what is the gap in (adjusted) college enrollment
(completion, delay of entry, type of college) between each quartile of family income and the top quartile. This gap
28can be negative. The last line of each panel presents a joint F-test that all gaps are equal to zero. We equate
these gaps with the proportion of people credit constrained within each family income - ability cell (assuming no
one is constrained in the top income quartile). Then to get Table 4 we multiply these gaps by the percentage of the
population in each cell. Panel A shows that 2.82% of the population is constrained. .46% of these 2.82% is in the
low AFQT - low-income cell.
Figure 8 is for individuals in all race and gender groups in Children of NLSY79. The same patterns hold within
race-gender groups.
29Table 1
Sample correlations for Instrument (Z), schooling (S) and AFQT (A)
White Males, NLSY79
ρZ,A > ρS,AρS,Z if ρS,Z > 0
Instrument ρZ,S ρZ,A ρS,A ρS,A ∗ ρS,Z or
ρZ,A <ρS, AρS, Z ifρS,Z < 0
number of siblings -0.2155 -0.1286 0.4233 -0.0912 Yes
(0.0181) (0.0211) (0.0162) (0.0091)
mother education 0.4334 0.3151 0.4233 0.1835 Yes
(0.0218) (0.0173) (0.0162) (0.0128)
father education 0.4470 0.3142 0.4233 0.1892 Yes
(0.0194) (0.0193) (0.0162) (0.0126)
distance to college -0.0456 -0.0522 0.4233 -0.0193 Yes
(0.0241) (0.0263) (0.0162) (0.0100)
avg. 4-yr college tuition 0.0071 0.0276 0.4233 0.0030 Yes
(0.0179) (0.0213) (0.0162) (0.0076)
avg.local blue collar wage -0.0291 0.0258 0.4233 -0.0123 No
(0.0186) (0.0226) (0.0162) (0.0080)
local unemployment rate -0.0651 -0.0403 0.4233 -0.0276 Yes
(0.0198) (0.0191) (0.0162) (0.0083)
birth quarter Jan-Mar 0.0162 0.0001 0.4233 0.0069 No
(0.0175) (0.0204) (0.0162) (0.0073)
birth quarter Apr-June 0.0256 -0.0079 0.4233 0.0108 No
(0.0205) (0.0193) (0.0162) (0.0085)
birth quarter July-Sept -0.0269 -0.0058 0.4233 -0.0114 No
(0.0157) (0.0209) (0.0162) (0.0067)
birth quarter Oct-Dec -0.0145 0.0140 0.4233 -0.0061 No
(0.0210) (0.0222) (0.0162) (0.0089)
· ρ is the correlation coeﬃcient
· We corrected for the eﬀect of schooling at test date on AFQT
1--  --
Table 2
Effects for a $1,000 Increase in Gross Tuition (Both Two- and Four-Year)
on the College Entry Probabilities of High School Completers
By Family Income Quartile and By AFQT Quartile
Whites Hispanics
(1) (3)
A. Overall Gross Tuition Effects  
(1) No explanatory variables except -.17 -.10  -.10
tuition in the model
(2) Baseline specication (see note at     -.06 -.04 -.06
table base, includes family income and
background, and so forth)
(3) Adding AFQT to the row (2) -.05 -.03  -.06
specification 
B.  By Family Income Quartiles (panel A row (2) specification)
(4) Top Quartile -.04  -.01 -.04
(5) Second Quartile -.06  -.03 -.05
(6) Third Quartile -.07  -.07 -.08
(7) Bottom Quartile -.06  -.05 -.08
(8) Joint Test of Equal Effects .49 .23  .66
Across Quartiles (P-values)
C.  By Family Income Quartiles (panel A row (3) specification) 
(9) Top Quartile -.02  -.02 -.02
(10) Second Quartile -.06  .00 -.05
(11) Third Quartile -.07  -.05 -.09
(12) Bottom Quartile -.04  -.04 -.07
(13) Joint Test of Equal Effects  .34 .45  .49
Across Quartiles (P-values)
D.  By AFQT Quartiles (panel A row (3) specification 
plus tuition-AFQT interaction terms)
(14) Top Quartile -.03  -.02 -.03
(15) Second Quartile -.06  -.01 -.05
(16) Third Quartile -.06  -.03 -.07
(17) Bottom Quartile -.05  -.03 -.05
(18) Joint Test of Equal Effects .60 .84  .68
Across Quartiles (P-values)
 Gross tuition is the nominal sticker-price of college and excludes scholarship and loan support.
Notes: These simulations assume both two-year and four-year college tuition increase by $1,000
for the population of high school completers.  The baseline specification used in row(2) or panel A and  
rows (4) through (7) of panel B includes controls for family background, family income, average wages in
the local labor market, tuition at local colleges, controls for urban and southern residence, tuition-family
income interactions, estimated Pell grant award eligibility, and dummy variables, that indicate the proxim- 
ity of two- and four-year colleges.  Definitions of the variables are located in Table 4.  The Panel D specifi-      
cation adds AFQT and an AFQT-tuition interaction to the baseline specification
Source: Cameron and Heckman (1999)
(2)
BlacksTable 3
NLSY79 White Males - Gaps in Enrollment, Completion, Delay, Type of College
(Measured from the Highest Income Quartile) Conditioning on Parental Education,
Number of Siblings, Broken Home, South, and Urban
AFQT Tercile 1 AFQT Tercile 2 AFQT Tercile 3 Total
Beta Std. Err. t-stat Beta Std. Err. t-stat Beta Std. Err. t-stat Beta Std. Err. t-stat
Panel A - Enrollment in College
q1-q4 -0.0471 0.0654 -0.7200 -0.0614 0.0631 -0.9700 0.0051 0.0612 0.0800 -0.0844 0.0335 -2.5200
q2-q4 -0.0344 0.0646 -0.5300 -0.0429 0.0551 -0.7800 -0.0141 0.0540 -0.2600 -0.0652 0.0315 -2.0700
q3-q4 -0.0527 0.0654 -0.8100 -0.0104 0.0502 -0.2100 -0.0735 0.0503 -1.4600 -0.0592 0.0303 -1.9500
All Gaps=0 F(3,459)=0.24 F(3,504)=0.44 F(3,496)=0.89 F(3,1611)=2.54
Panel B - Complete 4-Year College
q1-q4 0.2119 0.1243 1.7000 -0.0482 0.1002 -0.4800 0.1023 0.0821 1.2500 0.0130 0.0559 0.2300
q2-q4 0.2201 0.1217 1.8100 -0.0564 0.0845 -0.6700 0.0033 0.0681 0.0500 -0.0267 0.0488 -0.5500
q3-q4 0.1574 0.1230 1.2800 0.0596 0.0704 0.8500 -0.0326 0.0613 -0.5300 0.0189 0.0441 0.4300
All Gaps=0 F(3,105)=1.43 F(3,257)=0.81 F(3,277)=0.81 F(3,697)=0.29
Panel C - Complete 2-Year College
q1-q4 -0.3651 0.2865 -1.2700 -0.1143 0.1547 -0.7400 0.1179 0.0651 1.8100 -0.0497 0.0875 -0.5700
q2-q4 -0.1767 0.2176 -0.8100 -0.0960 0.1346 -0.7100 0.0726 0.0589 1.2300 -0.0084 0.0768 -0.1100
q3-q4 -0.0100 0.2088 -0.0500 0.0287 0.1281 0.2200 0.0368 0.0615 0.6000 0.1414 0.0744 1.9000
All Gaps=0 F(3,46)=0.92 F(3,73)=0.47 F(3,81)=1.22 F(3,224)=2.36
Panel D - Proportion of People not Delaying College Entry
q1-q4 -0.0737 0.1942 -0.3800 0.0959 0.1482 0.6500 0.0790 0.1129 0.7000 0.0307 0.0794 0.3900
q2-q4 -0.2882 0.1728 -1.6700 -0.0525 0.1044 -0.5000 -0.1129 0.0880 -1.2800 -0.1457 0.0621 -2.3500
q3-q4 -0.2663 0.1765 -1.5100 0.0580 0.0867 0.6700 -0.0424 0.0907 -0.4700 -0.0385 0.0580 -0.6600
All Gaps=0 F(3,59)=1.31 F(3,128)=0.53 F(3,140)=0.97 F(3,354)=2.32
Panel E - Years of Delay of College Entry
q1-q4 -0.1613 1.2995 -0.1200 0.4425 0.7474 0.5900 -0.0454 0.4722 -0.1000 0.1409 0.4142 0.3400
q2-q4 1.7718 1.1565 1.5300 0.9749 0.5267 1.8500 0.6813 0.3681 1.8500 1.2395 0.3237 3.8300
q3-q4 0.8889 1.1815 0.7500 0.1523 0.4373 0.3500 0.1950 0.3794 0.5100 0.3962 0.3026 1.3100
All Gaps=0 F(3,59)=1.22 F(3,128)=1.25 F(3,140)=1.28 F(3,354)=5.18
Panel F - Enrollment in 4-Year vs. 2-Year College
q1-q4 0.1356 0.1136 1.1900 -0.0184 0.0745 -0.2500 -0.1063 0.0676 -1.5700 -0.0128 0.0438 -0.2900
q2-q4 -0.0867 0.1034 -0.8400 -0.0429 0.0633 -0.6800 -0.1146 0.0575 -1.9900 -0.0572 0.0382 -1.5000
q3-q4 -0.1761 0.1013 -1.7400 0.0316 0.0546 0.5800 -0.0196 0.0542 -0.3600 -0.0224 0.0352 -0.6400
All Gaps=0 F(3,155)=2.95 F(3,334)=0.5 F(3,362)=1.82 F(3,925)=0.77
*q1-q4 — Gap in enrollment between quartiles 1 and 4
*q2-q4 — Gap in enrollment between quartiles 2 and 4
*q3-q4 — Gap in enrollment between quartiles 3 and 4
*All Gaps = 0 — Joint test for equality for enrollment across income groups
Notes: All gaps are measured relative to the highest income group within each ability class.
Each of the ﬁrst three columns in these tables represents a diﬀerent AFQT tercile. The last column groups all test scores terciles in one group.
Each of the ﬁrst three rows corresponds to a diﬀerent comparison between two income quartiles. The baseline quartile is the richest.
Ex: The gap in college enrollment between the lowest and the highest income quartile within the highest AFQT tercile is 0.0612.
See Appendix A for the deﬁnition of the sample.Table 4
Percentage of White Males Constrained [In Box] and
Breakdown by Components Into Income and Test Groups
A F Q T T e r c i l e 1A F Q T T e r c i l e 2A F Q T T e r c i l e 3 T o t a l
Panel A - Enrollment in College
Income Quartile 1 0.0046 0.0034 -0.0003 0.0077
Income Quartile 2 0.0032 0.0034 0.0011 0.0077
Income Quartile 3 0.0046 0.0011 0.0070 0.0128
Total 0.0124 0.0080 0.0078 0.0282
Panel B - Complete 4-Year College
Income Quartile 1 -0.0207 0.0027 -0.0053 -0.0234
Income Quartile 2 -0.0202 0.0045 -0.0003 -0.0159
Income Quartile 3 -0.0139 -0.0066 0.0031 -0.0173
Total -0.0548 0.0006 -0.0025 -0.0567
Panel C - Complete 2-Year College
Income Quartile 1 0.0357 0.0063 -0.0061 0.0359
Income Quartile 2 0.0162 0.0077 -0.0056 0.0183
Income Quartile 3 0.0009 -0.0032 -0.0035 -0.0058
Total 0.0528 0.0108 -0.0153 0.0484
Panel D - Proportion of People not Delaying College Entry
Income Quartile 1 0.0072 -0.0053 -0.0041 -0.0022
Income Quartile 2 0.0264 0.0042 0.0088 0.0394
Income Quartile 2 0.0235 -0.0064 0.0040 0.0211
Total 0.0571 -0.0075 0.0087 0.0584
Panel E - Enrollment in 4-Year vs. 2-Year College
Income Quartile 1 -0.0133 0.0010 0.0055 -0.0067
Income Quartile 2 0.0080 0.0034 0.0089 0.0203
Income Quartile 3 0.0155 -0.0035 0.0019 0.0139
Total 0.0102 0.0010 0.0163 0.0275
* Percentage of people constrained = (gap to highest income group) * (% of people in cell)
(a) A negative number means that the adjustment more than eliminates the gap.
Notes:
(1) We assume that agents in the highest income quartile are not constrained (whatever AFQT
tercile they are in) and estimate the percentage of people constrained in each cell using the
formula at the base of the table.
(2) Ex: The percentage of people constrained in their decision to enroll in college is 2.82% (see
the number in the total - total cell).
(3) The low income - low AFQT group accounts for 0.46% of this number (see the number on the
Income Quartile 1 - AFQT Tercile 1 cell).
(4) A negative number in this table means that the enrollment (completion, delay) gap
relative to the high income group is positive.
3Table 5
Percentage of Population Constrained by Race and Gender - NLSY79
Whites Blacks Hispanics Overall
Males Female Males Females Males Females
Enrollment in College 0.0282 0.0291 -0.0068 0.0506 0.0274 -0.0447 0.0249
Complete 4-year College -0.0567 0.0463 -0.0376 -0.0140 0.0746 0.0561 0.0001
Complete 2-year College 0.0484 0.0389 -0.0380 -0.0286 0.1319 0.0176 0.0382
Proportion Not Delaying College Entry 0.0584 -0.0210 0.0040 -0.0810 0.1271 -0.1028 0.0109
Enrollment in 4-year vs. 2-year College 0.0275 0.0367 0.0752 -0.0008 0.1184 -0.0679 0.0319
Notes: Percentage of people constrained = (gap to highest income quartile) * (% of people in cell). We
assume that the agents in the highest income quartile are not constrained, regardless of what AFQT tertile
they are in, and we estimate the percentage of people constrained in each cell using the above formula. To get the
overall column, we sum the percentages across the cells and weigh the cells by the proportion of the
population in that cell. These proportions are calculated using 1990 Census data. A negative number means
that the adjustment more than eliminates the gap.Source: Authors' calculations from October Current Population Survey Files
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NLSY79 White Males - College Enrollment
Figure 4
 We correct for the effect of schooling at test date on AFQT













NLSY79 White Males - Residuals of College Enrollment
Figure 5
 We correct for the effect of schooling at test date on AFQT
















NLSY79 White Males - Completion of 4 Year College 
Figure 6















NLSY79 White Males - Residuals of Completion of 4 Year College 
Figure 7
 We correct for the effect of schooling at test date on AFQT 






















Family Income is measured at the age of the test.
For details on the PIAT-Math test see BLS (2001).